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Fund-raising and Allocation of Green Climate Fund: Taking Global Pareto Optimality 
and Fiscal Balance into Consideration 
 
Abstract: This study analyzes how the Green Climate Fund (GCF) should raise and 
allocate funds to achieve Pareto optimality in climate governance globally and its own fiscal 
balance. To make the conclusion more suitable for global climate governance analysis, this 
study modifies the hypothesis of the public externality model constructed by Baumol and 
Oates. Subsequently, by comparing the Pareto optimality model of global climate governance 
and market equilibrium model, this study infers the unique price conditions to induce the 
market to satisfy Pareto-optimality requirements. Subsequently, this study deduces the rules 
and the possible ways that must be followed for raising capital and allocating of GCFs while 
considering global Pareto optimality and fiscal balance. The study observes that the 
equilibrium results of the international climate game will not achieve the global 
Pareto-optimality and the financial balance of GCF simultaneously when each country 
anticipates that the GCF aims to Pareto optimality in climate governance globally and its own 
fiscal balance. 
 
Keywords: Green Climate Fund; Capital Raising and Allocation; Global Pareto 
Optimality; Fiscal Balance; Mathematical Model. 








Climate change caused by excessive greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions affect the 
survival and development of all mankind. Therefore, controlling and mitigating GHG 
emissions and adapting to climate change have become a global public concern. As a global 
public externality, it would be essential to adopt a concerted and comprehensive approach 
across the globe to reduce GHG emissions. Therefore, in June 1992, the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, which 
initiated the practice of global climate governance. In this meeting, 154 countries or regions 
signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
According to the provisions of the UNFCCC, since 1995, the international community has 
been convening a conference of parties to the UNFCCC every year to discuss specific GHG 
reduction actions and institutional arrangements.  
Although the international environmental agreement on climate governance has not yet 
been formed, according to the dynamic game analysis of Chander (2010, 2017) and Chander 
&Wooders (2010), a grand coalition is an equilibrium coalition structure, and the only way to 
achieve a Pareto efficient outcome in the game would be to negotiate appropriate benefit 
transfer among countries across the globe. In fact, the global distribution of losses caused by 
climate change is uneven, and different countries have different historical responsibilities for 
global warming. Developed countries, as main emitters of GHGs, have an inescapable 
historical responsibility toward global warming (Lianbiao et al., 2015). In addition, 
differences in the economic development, science, technology, or the state of the ecological 
environment, among others, in each country leads to substantial differences in their 




necessary to coordinate responsibility and GHG mitigation in all countries around the world. 
It is in this context that international climate financing comes into the picture. 
Currently, several international environmental funds are involved in addressing climate 
change, such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF), Special Climate Change Fund 
(SCCF), Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), and Adaptation Fund (AF), among others 
(Lianbiao, 2014; Qian et al., 2015). However, these international environmental funds are 
limited in size and are yet to constitute a stable source of long-term funding. Therefore, it 
would be difficult to construct a systematic and comprehensive mechanism that can 
coordinate global participation and contribute toward resolving differences in interests in 
global climate governance through these funds. In addition, it is difficult for the capital 
sources of these traditional international environmental funds to achieve long-term funding 
goals (Lv ye and Yang Pu, 2017). Therefore, the Green Climate Fund (GCF) was proposed at 
the 2009 Convention’s Conference of Parties (COP) in Copenhagen (COP16) ，which is 
expected to play a key role in the governance of the long-term finance pledge (Fridahl and 
Linnér, 2016). The GCF was further negotiated at COP17 in Cancun in 2010, and it was 
finally agreed to start GCF’s operations at COP18 in Durban in 2011 (Qian et al., 2015; 
Lattanzio, 2014). According to the requirements of the Copenhagen Accord and the Cancún 
Agreements, developed countries were required to invest US$30 billion to accelerate the 
commencement of the GCF between 2010 and 2012, and to provide long-term funds 
amounting to US$100 billion annually by 2020 for helping developing countries cope with 
climate change (Fridahl and Linnér, 2016). However, until 2017, the developed countries 
have only injected capital totaling to US$10.3 billion to the GCF—far from the agreed target 
(Manzanares, 2017). Therefore, since inception, the GCF has been one of the crucial topics 




The academia has carried out in-depth discussions on the establishment purpose, 
operation mechanism, raising and allocation of funds, and fund use of the GCF, among others; 
however, fund raising and fund allocation remain the core issues of the GCF. Table I lists 
several major academic perspectives on these two core issues. Some studies have 
also simulated the implementation effect of various fund raising and allocation schemes (Cui 
et al., 2014; Antimiani et al., 2014). 









Financing scheme by auctioning the initial international GHG 
emission rights (Hof et al., 2011) 
2 
Financing scheme by collecting the international aviation and 
marine carbon tax (Hof et al.., 2011) 
3 
Financing scheme by collecting the international carbon tax (Hof 
et al., 2011; Silverstein, 2013) 
4 
Financing scheme that taxes the clean development mechanism 
(CDM) transactions (Hof et al., 2011) 
5 
Financing scheme based on the special drawing rights (SDR) of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Zonglu, 2013) 
6 
Financing schemes for developed countries based on historical 
emissions responsibility Cui et al., 2015) 






Financing schemes based on the United Nations’ membership dues 
(Cui et al., 2015) 
9 
Financing schemes based on Official the Development Assistance 
(ODA) (Cui et al., 2015) 
10 
Financing schemes based on Global Environment Facility (GEF) 




GCFs are allocated according to the principle of carbon emission 
reduction contribution. (Cui et al., 2015) 
2 
GCFs are allocated according to the adaptation needs and emission 
reduction potential of developing countries. (Silverstein, 2013) 
3 
GCFs are allocated according to the national climate loss and 
economic strength (Cui et al., 2014) 
4 
GCFs are allocated based on the fairness of results and procedural 
justice (Grasso, 2010) 
Source: This study is organized. 
 
While the existing literature discusses the raising of capital and allocation of GCF, it has 
certain gaps; this study aims to fill these gaps in the existing literature.  
First, the goal of GCF will affect the ways and means of raising and distributing funds. 
Currently, the main purpose of GCF is to help developing countries adapt to climate change. 
However, the unsatisfactory financing situation of GCF shows that such goal guidance seems 
hard to be fully accepted by all countries in the world, and therefore it is difficult to establish 
a long-term stable international climate interest coordination mechanism. The international 




funding under the UNFCCC after 2020 to deal with climate change caused by excessive 
GHG emissions. So the core task of GCF is to solve the problem of climate change on the 
basis of understanding the causes of excessive greenhouse gas emissions. The root cause of 
the climate change problem is the fact that GHGs brings immediate benefits to the emitting 
country, but increases the stock of GHGs in the atmosphere which affects the present and 
future welfare of all countries. In the absence of any cooperation among the countries, each 
country when deciding its emissions takes account of only its own benefits and costs. As a 
result, the total emissions from all countries are too high compared to the Pareto optimal 
emissions (Parkash, 2017). Therefore, this study thinks that the goal of GCF is to coordinate 
global GHG emission and reduction behavior and eventually realize the Pareto optimality in 
climate governance globally. 
Second, concerning the raising of funds and the allocation of GCF, the existing literature 
focused primarily on empirical analysis and principle discussion, and gave less attention to 
theoretical modeling. As analyzed above, the GCF will ultimately pursue pareto optimality in 
global climate governance. Therefore, the key to theoretical model analysis is to find out the 
answer to the question that how should GCF raise and allocate funds to ensure that the market 
equilibrium can achieve the global Pareto optimal efficiency. However, the existing literature 
on modeling global climate governance has mainly concentrated on the game analysis of 
international environmental agreement on global climate governance, the global 
environmental policy, and local environmental policy coordination analysis, among others. 
Baumol and Oates (1988) constructed the mathematical model of public externality and 
demonstrated the only price conditions required to make the market equilibrium realize 
Pareto optimal. Concerning the global public externality, in principle, the conclusions of 
Baumol and Oates (1988) also apply to the global climate governance analysis. However, the 




exist a commodity consumed or produced by any economic entity, and the commodity has a 
unified transaction price, namely, the commodity can be the value measurement standard of a 
different economic entity. They (1988) assert that the assumptions in the real economy are 
tenable; for example, leisure (labor) is such an item that is used by every economic entity (no 
one can work 24 hours per day, and every vendor needs to use labors), that is, labor can be a 
common value standard. In the real economy, however, a unified global labor market and 
labor price does not exist. Therefore, when analyzing global public externalities, such as 
climate change, the assumptions do not seem to hold. To this end, this study expands the 
hypothetical condition into hypothesis 3, which makes the conclusion of this study more 
suitable for the global public externality analysis. 
Third, to ensure long-term operations, as a non-profit international climate financing 
mechanism, the GCF must consider the raising of capital and allocation of GCF as a whole 
while considering the fiscal balance of payments. Existing literature has not explored much 
about how such a precondition constraint affects the raising of capital and the allocation of 
GCF. In fact, the Pigovian tax is slightly different when considering the balance of payments 
as compared to considering the fiscal balance of payments (Baumol and Oates, 1988). Thus, 
based on the only price condition to induce the market to satisfy the Pareto optimality 
requirements and by considering the fiscal balance of GCF, this study deduces he rules and 
the possible ways that must be followed for raising capital and allocating of GCF while 
considering global Pareto optimality and fiscal balance. Then, this study further discusses the 
way to determine the value of the variables affecting the implementation of fund-raising and 
allocation plan of the GCF.  
Finally, when countries anticipate that the policy adopted by GCF should achieve both 
Pareto-optimal of global climate governance and financial balance of GCF, what will be the 




constructs an international climate game model that incorporates policy expectations and 
reveals that the game equilibrium result will not achieve the financial balance of GCF and the 
global Pareto-optimality simultaneously.  
The contents of the remaining part of the paper are as follows: Section 2 describes the 
basic problem, basic idea, and basic assumption of this paper. Section 3 infers the necessary 
and sufficient price conditions to render identical the competitive equilibrium and Pareto 
optimality conditions. Section 4 deduces he rules and the possible ways that must be followed 
for raising capital and allocating of GCF while considering global Pareto optimality and 
fiscal balance. Section 5 discusses the decision of relative parameters that determine the 
raising of capital and allocation of GCF. Section 6 presents the conclusion and policy 
recommendations. 
2 Basic Questions, Ideas, and Assumptions 
2.1 Basic questions 
There are I countries producing and consuming K products in the world, using i  and 
i  as the index of the country, k  as the index of the product. 0kix   and kiy  denote the 
amount of goods (resource) k  consumed and produced (used), respectively, by country i . 
kir  denotes the initial quantity of goods(resource) k  available to country i . is  , 0S and 
0= 0i
i
S S s  denote the amount of GHGs emitted by country  , the initial stock of GHGs 






. We assume that each unit of GHG 
emissions would need to use one unit of GHG emissions permit. 1( , , , )i i Ki if y y s  is country 
si，  production function and 1( , , , ) 0i i Ki if y y s   is country si




1( , , , )i i KiU x x S  is country si
，  utility, which is determined by the number of K  products 






, we can obtain 
= =i i i
i i
U U US
s S s S
  

   
. While 
kix ， kiy , and is  are flow variables, S  is a stock variable as 
formally defined below. 
The problem that this study attempts to solve is how the GCF can raise and allocate 
funds to achieve both the Pareto optimality of global climate governance and the fiscal 
balance of the GCF. 
2.2 Basic ideas 
In order to solve the basic problems mentioned above, this paper will follow the 
following train of thought. 
First, referring to the model of Baumol and Oates(1988) and Marchiori et al.(2017), and 
based on the nonlinear programming theory, the study builds the Pareto optimal model of 
global climate governance and the market equilibrium model; additionally, according to the 
K-T theorem, the study obtains the Pareto optimal condition and the market equilibrium 
condition.  
Second, by comparing Pareto optimal conditions and market equilibrium conditions, the 
study aims to ascertain what price conditions should be met to make the market equilibrium 
achieve Pareto optimality, which is defined as optimal equilibrium prices below. 
Third, according to the optimal equilibrium prices, the study added fiscal balance 
constraints and deduced the plan for raising and allocation of GCF. 




There are four basic hypotheses involved in this study: 
Hypothesis 1: Each country pursues its own welfare maximization. 
Hypothesis 2: The GCF seeks to balance the Pareto optimality of global climate 
governance with its own fiscal balance. As discussed above, the goal of GCF is to coordinate 
global GHG emission and reduction behavior and eventually realize the Pareto optimality in 
climate governance globally. According to the pareto rules(Baumol and Oates, 1988), there is 
a need to tax or subsidize the activities that make or cut externalities, thereby internalizing the 
external costs or benefits of making or cutting externalities. In the process of implementing 
such pareto rules, all the subsidies to countries for their reducing GHG emissions come from 
all countries in the world, and all the taxes paid by countries for their emitting GHGs are 
applied to all countries in the world. Therefore, the total net subsidies of all countries should 
be equal to zero. In other words, as a non-profit international organization, in addition to 
achieving Pareto optimal GHG emissions globally, the GCF must also consider its fiscal 
balance to maintain its own operations. 
Hypothesis 3: The feasible set of consumption complexes for each country is convex, 
closed, bounded from below in the x s , and contains the null vector; the utility function that 
represents each country’s preferences is twice differentiable, quasi-concave, and increasing in 
the x s ; the feasible production set for each country is defined by a set of technical 
constraints that are twice differentiable and define a convex production possibility set. Under 
these circumstances, as is well-known, the solution to the maximization problem that is about 
to be described, exists and is unique (Baumol and Oates, 1988). 
Hypothesis 4: There is a group of goods: (1) any of this group of goods is produced or 
consumed by at least one country; (2) any country produced at least one of goods in the group 
and consumed at least one of goods in the group; (3) each country can have direct or indirect 




market for any goods in the group. An example of this hypothesis is as following. Supposing 
there are four countries. Both country 1 and country 2 have produced or consumed goods A. 
Both country 3 and country 4 have produced or consumed goods B. If neither country 1 nor 
country 2 have produced or consumed same goods with country 3 or country 4, that is there is 
no direct or indirect economic connection between country 1, country 2 and country 3, 
country 4, so this scenario doesn’t satisfy Hypothesis 4(see Figure 1.a).  If at least one 
country of country 1 and country 2 has produced or consumed at least one same goods with at 
least one country of country 3 and country 4, arbitrarily say both country 1 and country 3 
have produced or consumed the goods C, then Any of the four countries has a direct or 
indirect relationship with any other country in this scenario which satisfy Hypothesis 4. 
Goods A, Goods B and Goods C comprise the group of goods in Hypothesis 4. This 
assumption ensures that all countries can measure and compare values through interrelated 
markets. Baumol and Oates (1988) assumed that there exist a commodity consumed or 
produced by any economic entity, and the commodity has a unified transaction price. They 
(1988) think that leisure (labor) is just such a commodity. In the real economy, however, a 
unified global labor market and labor price does not exist. Therefore, when analyzing global 
public externalities, such as climate change, the assumptions do not seem to hold. This 






3 Comparative Analyses of Global Pareto Optimality and Market Equilibrium  
3.1 Global Pareto optimality model 




max : ( , , , )
. . : ( , , , ) ( 2 3 ),
( , , , ) 0 ( ),
( ) ( ).
K
i i Ki i
i i Ki i
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i i
U x x S
s t U x x S U i I
f y y s i
x y r k
  
 
   
, , ,
    (1) 
Model (1) maximizes the utility of any arbitrarily chosen country, say country 1, subject 
to the requirements that there be no consequent loss to any other country, and that the 
constraints constituted by the production functions( 1( , , , ) 0 ( )i i Ki if y y s i  ) and the 
availability of resources ( ( )ki ki ki
i i
x y r k    ) are satisfied. 
We obtain the Lagrangian as follows:  
1 [ ( ) ] ( ) { [ ( )]}i i i i i k ki ki ki
i i k i i






Figure 1.a scenario not satisfying hypothesis 4 
Figure1  The graphic description of hypothesis 4 










The Greek letters( i 、 i 、 k )in (2) all represent Lagrange multipliers. Differentiating in 
turn with respect to the 
kix , kiy , and is , we obtain the Kuhn-Tucker conditions ((5
o)—(7o)) 
given in the first column of Table I.  
3.2 Market equilibrium model 
Our objective is to determine the characteristics of the prices, assuming that they exist, 
which will induce the behavior patterns necessary (and sufficient) for the satisfaction of our 
Pareto optimality conditions and determine whether that set of prices is unique. Thus, it is 
more convenient to first consider the corresponding market equilibrium requirements. 
We can formulate the welfare maximization problem of country i  as model (3): 
1
1
min : [ *( )] *( ) *
. . : ( , , , )
( , , , ) 0.
k ki ki ki i i i
k
i i Ki i
i i Ki i
p x y r t s s T S
s t U x x S U
f y y s




   (3) 
In model (3), we use the following notation: 
kp = the price of good (resource) k ; 
t = the price of GHG emission rights; 
is = the quantity of initial GHG emission rights possessed by country i ; 
S = i
i
s = the global total quantity of initial GHG emission rights; 
iT = the subsidies assigned to country i  for per unit of GHGs stock that exceeds 
i
i
s  . 
The country i  in the model (3) is taken to minimize the expenditure necessary to 
achieve any given level of the utility, iU , subject to the constraints of the production function, 




2 [ *( )] *( ) *( ) [ ( ) ] ( )k ki ki ki i i i i i i i i i i
k i i
L p x y r t s s T s s U U f              
 (4) 
(where i  is a Lagrange multiplier). We immediately obtain the Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions ((5c)—(7c))  given in the second column of Table II. 
Table II: Kuhn-Tucker conditions for optimality with climate change 














































































































































Data source: Research consolidation 
3.3 The price-tax solution 
We define prices that sustain a competitive equilibrium that is Pareto-optimal as optimal 
equilibrium prices.  
Proposition 1: We can infer that price conditions (5
e
)—(7e) are optimal equilibrium 
prices. In addition, for all 0kix  、 0kiy  , the price condition (5
e
)—(7e) is the necessary 
and sufficient condition to induce each country to select Pareto-optimal activity levels.  




While for all =0kix 、 =0kiy  price conditions, (5
e)—(7e) is not the only sufficient 
condition to yield equality between the market and Pareto-optimal activity levels, other 
policies for good i  are not relevant to countries that do not consume or produce any good i . 
In fact, when we do not know if 
kix  and kiy  are greater than 0 or equal to 0 beforehand, the 
price condition (5e)—(7e)tends to be the only necessary and sufficient condition that can 
induce each country to select Pareto-optimal activity levels. In other words, they are optimal 
equilibrium prices. 
4 The Green Climate Fund: Fund Raising and Allocation Plan 
4.1 Analysis on global Pareto-optimal conditions 
The GCF is set to achieve the goal of coordinating the national GHG emissions 
reduction benefits and ultimately achieve global Pareto optimality. As the optimal equilibrium 
price condition is the necessary and sufficient condition for the market equilibrium to achieve 
Pareto optimality, for calculating GCF subsidies or taxes on the national GHG emissions, Eq. 
(7e) needs to be satisfied and that is 
( ) ( )i i
i i i








                  (8) 
Subject to Eq. (8), to achieve Pareto optimal GHG emissions globally, the GCF must 
meet Pareto rules during the raising of funds and allocation of GCF. The reduction (increase) 
of a unit of GHG emissions must be subsidized, wherein the net subsidies must be equal the 
total marginal benefit offered by the unit of GHG to all other countries across the world. If 
the total marginal benefit is positive, then the net subsidy would be positive, and vice versa, 
that is, where the net subsidy is negative, tax levy would be required for that country. 




As a non-profit international organization, in addition to achieving Pareto optimal GHG 
emissions globally, the GCF must also consider its fiscal balance to maintain its own 
operations. The restraint of fiscal balance can be described by Eq. (9) 
            
1
[ * ( ) * ( ) ] +
I
i i i i i
i i i
t s s T s s C D

                    (9)       
where 
1




t s s T S

   specifies the total net subsidies to all countries given by 
the GCF; D denotes all other revenues (including public fund donations, private donations, 
and grants from various agencies) unrelated to GHG emissions acquired by the GCF; 
C expresses all other expenditures (including operating costs of GCF and research 
expenditures) unrelated to GHG emissions paid by the GCF. 
Subject to Eqs. (8) and (9), we can obtain the only solution of t  and 
iT (refer to 










             (10) 
It must be noted that 0i i
i i
s s   is crucial. In the real economy, 0S  , 1I  , 0 1S   
and 0S  , that is, the global total net GHG emissions are greater than zero, the number of 
countries participating in the GCF is greater than one, and the global total initial GHG 
emission quota is greater than or equal to zero. Therefore, we can conclude that 
0(1 ) 0S I S S    . 












In the Eqs. (10) and (11), S denotes the global total initial GHG emissions quota, 





 specifies the marginal damage 







  measures the global total 
marginal damage caused by per unit stock of GHGs. Based on Eq. (10), the price of GHG 
emissions permit ( t ) can be divided into two parts: 
0
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      (13) 
where (12)denotes basic prices of GHG emissions rights and(13) expresses price 
adjustment according to the income surplus that is not related to GHG emissions in order to 
maintain the fiscal balance of GCF. Similarly, according to Eq. (11), the subsidies assigned to 





















S I S S

  
      (15) 
where (14)denotes the basic subsidies. 
Eq. (8) is the only necessary and sufficient condition for market equilibrium to achieve 




fiscal revenue and expenditure, that is, both are unique. Thus, the only set of solutions—Eqs. 
(10) and (11) derived from Eqs. (8) and (9)—are also unique. 
4.3 Fund-raising and allocation plan for the GCF 
Based on Eqs. (10) and (11), we can obtain the financial surplus of the GCF: 
1 0 0
0 0
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 
  
;  can be defined as a balance factor of fiscal revenue and 
expenditure that are related only with the global total initial GHG emissions quota S , the 
global final total GHG emissions S , and the number of global countries I
1 .   is 
proportional to S and 0S , but inversely proportional to S  and I . Therefore, we can obtain 
the plan for the raising of capital and allocation of GCF based on both global Pareto 
optimality and fiscal balance. 
(I) Given below are four main ways that can be employed to raise funds for the GCF: 
Way 1: When
0 0
( 1) ( )
+ 0











     

, countries with excessive 
historical net GHG emissions and those exceeding their initial emission rights should pay the 
                                                        
1 To be precise, I should be the number of countries involved in the GCF mechanism; this study assumes that all countries 




climate funds to GCF, that is, if 0i is s   in country i  , then this country should 
contribute 
0 0
( 1) ( )
[ + ]*( )













     

 amount of climate funds to the 
GCF. 
Way 2: When
( 1) ( )
0











   

, countries whose historical net 
GHG emissions are lesser than their initial emission rights should pay the climate funds to 
GCF, that is, if 0i is s   in country i , then this country should 
contribute 
0 0
( 1) ( )
[ ]*( )













     

 amount of climate funds to the 
GCF. 
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in country i , then this 


















      

 amount of 
climate funds to the GCF. 
Way 4: The GCF acquires all other revenues unrelated to GHG emissions, including 
public fund donations, private donations, or grants from various agencies. 
(II) Given below are four main ways to allocate funds for the GCF: 
Way 1: When
0 0
( 1) ( )
0











     

, countries that are active in 




should receive climate subsidies from the GCF, that is, if 0i is s  in country i , then the 
GCF should allocate 
0 0
( 1) ( )
[ ]*( )













     

 amount of climate 
subsidies to this country. 
Way 2: When
0 0
( 1) ( )
0











     

, countries with excessive 
historical net GHG emissions and those exceeding their initial emission rights should receive 
climate subsidies from the GCF, that is, if 0i is s   in country i , then the GCF should 
allocate 
0 0
( 1) ( )
[ ]*( )













     

 amount of climate subsidies to 
this country. 
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      

 amount of climate subsidies 
to this country. 
Way 4: The GCF pays all other expenditures unrelated to GHGs emissions, including 
the operating costs of GCF or other research expenditures.  
5 Further Discussions on Fund-raising and Allocation Plan of the GCF 
5.1 Discussion of variable settings 
According to Eqs. (10), (11), and (16), to implement GCF's plan of raising the capital 




and financial balance in the Green Climate Fund Organization, we need to determine the 5 
variables described as following: 
①C  denotes the expenditures paid by the GCF and not related to GHG emissions. It 
cannot be pre-determined, but it can be gradually determined with the operation of the GCF. 
②D  denotes the revenues acquired by the GCF and unrelated to GHG emissions. It 
cannot be pre-determined, but it can be gradually determined with the operation of the GCF. 
③ S  denotes the expected final global stock of GHGs. It is preset according to the goals 
of the GCF. There are two possible scenarios. If the GCF pursues Pareto optimality in global 
climate governance, then scientific research should be conducted to assess the global 
Pareto-optimal stock of GHGs. If the GCF pursues the periodic goal of global climate 
governance, then it will need to facilitate consultations among the countries of the world to 
determine S
1. 
④ I  denotes the number of countries participating in the GCF. Since the climate change 
due to GHG emissions affects all the countries across the world, I  should be set as the 








 denotes the impact of a unit of stock of GHGs on the country i  and needs 
to be determined through scientific research. 
                                                        
1 The global climate has been making progress in each planning period, since several years. 
For example, progress was witnessed in the first commitment period of the Kyoto protocol, 
which was from 2008 to 2012, and, subsequently, in the second commitment period of the 
Kyoto protocol, which was from 2013 to 2020. In the future, global climate governance will 





is ( S ) denotes country i 's initial GHG emission rights. It needs to be negotiated at a 
global level. Currently, there are the following three main viewpoints on the determination of 
each country’s initial GHG emission rights: 
(I)The initial GHG emission rights of each country are zero, that is, =0is . 
(II)Each country’s initial GHG emission rights are determined through the 
grandfather principle, that is, the initial GHG emission rights are determined based 
on existing GHG emissions of each country. 
(III)Countries independently declare their own right to emit GHGs. When the final 
global stock of GHGs is given, the global permissive GHG emissions is then set.  
In the case of this scenario, the main purpose of countries involved in the 
international climate game is to obtain more GHG emission rights to maximize their 
own welfare. That is to say that the actions of all the countries are focused on 
maximizing their own interests, including self-declaration to determine their initial 
GHG emission rights. The first order conditions (FOCs) for (
is ) to be an optimum 
are:  









                     (17) 
Substituting the Eqs. (10) and (11) into Eq. (17), we have (Refer to Appendix C for 
specific details):  









   
  and 0(1 )S S I S   )(18) 
Summarizing all countries’ 
is , we obtain: 




In the case where (19) is established, the denominator of Eqs. (10) and (11) is zero, that 
is, t and iT  cannot be obtained. This shows that the equilibrium results of the international 
climate game will not achieve the global Pareto-optimality and the financial balance of GCF 
simultaneously when each country anticipates that the GCF aims to Pareto optimality in 
climate governance globally and its own fiscal balance. 
5.2 Conditions that set 0t   must be met 
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                              (19) 
It should be noted that, only to meet the formula (18), t  will be equal to zero. 
According to the analysis of Appendix C, formula (18) is almost impossible to meet in the 
real economy; therefore, =0t , generally, cannot be set. 
5.3 Conditions that set 0iT  must be met 
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Therefore, it can be seen that 0iT  must meet the following two conditions at the same 










，that is, a unit 
stock of GHGs has the same marginal impact on countries. 2) The global total quantity of 
initial GHG emission rights must be set as 0
(1 )
(1 ) ii










. In the real 
economy, however, such conditions can hardly be satisfied. Under the conditions 0iT  , we 
have 
0
( 1)( )I D C
t
S S S IS IS
 

   
. 
6 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
In this study, first, the Pareto optimal model and market equilibrium model of global 
climate management are constructed; subsequently, the Pareto optimal conditions and market 
equilibrium conditions are obtained. The two conditions are compared to achieve the optimal 
equilibrium prices, which induce the market to satisfy the Pareto optimality requirements. In 
other words, the reduction (increase) of a unit of GHG emissions must be subsidized, wherein 
the net subsidies would be equal to the total marginal benefit offered by the unit of GHGs to 
all other countries of the world; additionally, if the total marginal benefit is positive, then the 
net subsidy would be positive, and vice versa. 
Subsequently, by adding fiscal balance constraints to the optimal equilibrium prices, this 
study deduces the price condition that the GCF must meet when it raises and allocates funds 
to achieve Pareto optimality globally and fiscal balance of payments. This leads to the 
formulation of the plan of raising capital and allocating the GCF. At the same time, the study 
also discusses ways to determine different economic variables for the implementation of the 




of the international climate game will not achieve the global Pareto-optimality and the 
financial balance of GCF simultaneously when each country anticipates that the GCF aims to 
Pareto optimality in climate governance globally and its own fiscal balance. This means that 
it is not feasible to determine the initial amount of GHG emissions rights in the form of 
voluntary emissions reduction under the premise that the GCF pursues the goal of achieving 
global Pareto optimality and its own fiscal balance in future.  
Therefore, this study concludes with the following policy recommendations for the 
further development of the GCF: 
I) Clear short-term and long-term GCF funding and distribution of funds  
Currently, due to the lack of scientific and technological information, the specific 
influence of GHG emissions on countries has not yet achieved a unified consensus; however, 
the international community has a clear understanding that the developed countries should 
have more historical responsibility than developing countries. In addition, the real economy, 
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. During the beginning of the operations, the GCF could 
mainly follow Way 1 and Way 4 to raise funds; that is, the corresponding operational funds 
were provided by the developed countries with more historical responsibilities and through 
the contributions from various public welfare funds, private donations, and funds of various 
institutions. The GCF could allocate funds mainly through Way 1 and Way 4. With a clarity 
on the relevant information and a consensus, in the long-term, the GCF can also follow Way 
3 to raise funds and can allocate funds using the Way 3. 
II)  Initiate related research and negotiations to determine various parameters of fund 




First, on the basis of construction of the GCF, carry out the research of *S ( the global 





( impact of a unit of stock of GHGs on country i ). 
Second, start negotiations on the world’s initial GHG emission rights, and subsequently, on 
the accounting of S .  
In particular, under the premise that the GCF pursues the goal of achieving global pareto 
optimality and its own fiscal balance in future, it is not feasible to determine the initial 
amount of GHG emission rights in the form of voluntary emission reduction. However, the 
following should be considered: (1) other ways of determining each country’s initial amount 
of GHG emission rights or (2) before targeting the global Pareto optimality and fiscal balance 
of GCF, each country’s initial amount of GHG emission rights was determined. 
Finally, on the basis of various parameter assessment and initial greenhouse gas 
emission rights negotiation, the basic price of GHG emission rights and the basic subsidies to 
country i  for per unit stock of GHGs can be estimated according to the formulas of Eqs. (12) 
And (14), respectively. Subsequently, in each financial cycle of the GCF, according to the Eq. 
(13) or Eq. (15), estimate the price adjustment according to the income surplus unrelated to 




Appendix A : Proof of Proposition 1 
We will prove first that the conditions(5e)—(7e) in table II are sufficient to induce the 
market to satisfy the Pareto optimality requirements. Substituting the value of 
kp , iT , and t  
from (5e)—(7e) into (5c)—(7c), we see that the system of inequalities and equations 
determining the competitive equilibrium becomes identical with the system of inequalities 




kis , i , and i . Thus, 
these systems will have the same solutions, so that if they are unique, then we 
have o cki kix x ,
o c
ki kiy y ,
o c
i is s . 
We may ask whether conditions (5e)—(7e) are absolutely required for achieving 
optimality. The answer is that they are, if we accept the plausible Hypothesis 4. 
To deal with this issue, the uniqueness of the prices solution (5e)—(7e), we must assume 
that there is a set of prices that yield equality between the market and Pareto-optimal activity 
levels (i.e., that there exists o cki kix x ,
o c
ki kiy y ,
o c
i is s ,
o c
S S ). Subsequently, we ask what 
values of the
kp , t , and iT  are consistent with these relationships. Assume goods 
1=1,2, ,k K ( 11 K K  ) satisfied the Hypothesis 4, and let 11 2= , , ,k Kp p p p  represent the 
prices of this set of goods, respectively. 
According to Hypothesis 4, goods =1k  is produced or consumed by at least one 
country, and assuming it is produced or consumed by countries 1 2 (2 )i I I I  、、 、 . If 





















 （ 1 2i I 、、 、 ）     （A.2） 
























          （A.4） 
Taking k  as our standard of value, we set arbitrarily 
k k
p            (A.5) 
For any country i{1, 2,…, I }, if goods =1k  is consumed by country i , then we 










   
 
 









   
 
 
（ 1 2i I 、、 、 ）   （A.7） 
From above analysis, it can be seen that equations (A.6) or (A.7) hold for all countries 
that are economically connected to each other through goods 1. 
According to Hypothesis 4, the countries that produced or consumed goods 1 must also 
produced or consumed other goods besides goods 1, otherwise, they will not have direct or 
indirect economic relations with countries that do not produce or consume goods 1. Assuming 
some of the countries that produced or consumed goods 1 also produced or consumed goods 
2, suppose goods 2 is produced or consumed by country i I . In addition, goods 2 may also 
be produced or consumed by countries besides countries 1 2i I 、、 、 . Suppose countries 
1i I I I 、 、 、  produced or consumed goods 2. If goods 2 is consumed by countries 
























 （ 1i I I I 、 、 、 ）    （A.9） 






















 （ 1i I I I 、 、 、 ）    （A.11） 




  . Therefore, we obtain 
2 2
2 2






















       （A.13） 









   
 
 
      （A.14） 









   
 
 
      （A.15） 
From above analysis, it can be seen that equations i i   or i i   hold for all 




According to Hypothesis 4, each economic agent can have direct or indirect economic 
relations with any other economic agent through the goods 1=1,2, ,k K , and any country 
produced at least one of goods in the group and consumed at least one of goods in the group. 
Therefore, following the same argument, we can infer that only if hypothesis 4 is true, for all 
countries, we will have 
i i          （A.16） 
i i          （A.17） 
Subsequently, by (5o), (5c), and (A.16), we must obtain, for any goods k , if it is 
consumed by country i  
i i





     
 
, for all 0kix      (A.18) 
We can also obtain, for any goods k , if it is used or produced by country i  
i i





     
 
     (A.19) 
Subsequently, by (7o), (7c), (A.16), and (A.17), we must have 
= = ( )i i i i i
i i i i i i
i ii i i i i
UU f U f
T t
s s s s s
    

   
   
       (A.20) 
By (A.15), (A.16), (A.17), (A.18), and (A.19), we have proved that for all 
0kix  , 0kiy  ，the price conditions (5
e)—(7e) in Table II are necessary and sufficient 





Appendix B: Proof of t  and 
iT  
The Eq. (9) 
1




t s s T S C D

     can be expanded as follows： 
+ + 0i
i
t S t S S T C D            (B.1) 
Summarizing Eq. (8) for all countries, we obtain: 
( )i
i i








         (B.2) 
Both sides of Eq. (B.2) are multiplied by S  and subtracted by Eq. (B.1). We obtain: 
0
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i i i i i
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       (B.3) 
 Based on Eq. (B.3), we obtain: 
0 0
( ) ( )
(1 ) (1 )
i i
i i
i i i i i i i
U U
C D S C D S
s S
t
S I S S S I S S
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    
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 
  (B.4) 
It must be noted that 0 0
1
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        is crucial. We have: 
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Subject to Eq. (B.4) and Eq. (B.5), we obtain: 
0 0
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Appendix C: The derivation of 
is under the independent declaration 
In formula (8), take the derivative of both sides with respect to 








           (C.1) 
According to Eq. (17) and Eq. (C.1), we have: 
*( ) * = *( ) =0i
i i i i
i i i
Tt t
s s t S s s S t
s s s
 
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  
   (C.2) 
According to formula (10), we have: 
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      (C.3) 
Substituting Eq. (10) and Eq. (C.3) into Eq. (C.2) and sorting out: 
2
0 0
( 1) ( ) ( 1) ( )
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   
  and 0 (1 )S S S I   , we have: 
*
0+ ( 2)i is s S S I S            (C.5) 
C D represent a net pay for GCFs not related to GHGs emissions, which the GCF 
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Appendix D: Conditions that set 0iT  must be met 
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